Photo of Anshuman Sakle

Partner in the Competition Practice at the Mumbai office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Anshuman advises on the full range of competition matters, including merger control, abuse of dominance and cartel enforcement. He can be reached at anshuman.sakle@cyrilshroff.com

In a recently released order, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has imposed a token penalty of INR 5 lakhs (approx. USD 7800) on ITC Limited (ITC) for its failure to notify a combination. The combination relates to ITC’s acquisition of the trademarks “Savlon” and “Shower to Shower”, along with other related assets, from Johnson & Johnson by way of two separate asset purchase agreements entered into on 12 February 2015.

In its order, the CCI has held that trademarks are assets for the purposes of the Competition Act, 2002 (as amended) (Competition Act). Further, the order also re-emphasises the position that the Indian merger control regime relates to not only an acquisition of one or more enterprises but also acquisition of control, shares, voting rights or assets of another enterprise. In the event the jurisdictional thresholds prescribed under Section 5 of the Act are met, such an acquisition requires prior notification to, and approval from, the CCI.

Continue Reading The CCI Reinforces Trademarks are Assets

This piece was first published in the October 2017 edition of the Manupatra Competition Law Reports.


Over the years arbitration has become a preferred private and consensual mode of dispute resolution. Arbitral tribunals and courts have been dealing with complex contracts and rapidly evolving the law relating to arbitrations. An issue commonly faced by arbitral tribunals is whether the dispute referred to it is arbitrable in the first place. These questions commonly arise when allegations of fraud are made before a tribunal, or a reference is made to decide issues relating to competition law.

Traditionally, courts across jurisdictions have taken the view that competition law disputes are non-arbitrable. This was because arbitration being a private and consensual mode of dispute resolution, was considered to be an inappropriate forum for deciding competition law issues which related to the larger public interest of promoting competitive markets. However, around late 1980s to early 1990s, the judicial trend on arbitration of competition law disputes changed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth[1] (Mitsubishi) and the European Court of Justice’s decision in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International N.V.[2] held that an arbitral tribunal could also arbitrate upon competition law issues. Continue Reading Arbitrating Competition Law Disputes in India

This piece was first published in the October 2017 issue of The Practical Lawyer [(2017) PL (Comp. L) October 104]


Antitrust authorities worldwide have actively investigated and penalised dominant enterprises on various types of anti-competitive conduct. However, historically, very few cases have been pursued on the issue of excessive pricing by dominant entities. It is a popular perception that this seemingly unanimous reluctance by competition authorities to initiate cases in this realm of antitrust laws could be attributable to the perceived difficulties in establishing when pricing is truly excessive. While the allegations of excessive pricing have been often brought up in a multitude of jurisdictions, its successful enforcement has been rare given the challenges in determination of the ambit of ‘excessive’ and against what ‘benchmark’ price should it be compared. This coupled with the paucity of substantial evidence concerning the costs and expenditures incurred in manufacturing/providing the goods/services, and the presence of commercial justifications for charging the excess over and above the costs and a reasonable margin[1] have further contributed to the dormancy of this rather key issue under antitrust laws. We briefly examine here the concept of excessive pricing, reasons it is fraught with difficulties and the old as well as the recent decisions which have the potential to be a game-changer in the domain of ‘excessive pricing’.

Continue Reading Excessive Pricing: A Neglected Antitrust Concept?

This piece was first published in the September 2017 issue of The Practical Lawyer [(2017) PL (Comp. L) September 82]


The Indian merger control regime has evolved substantially over the years since its introduction in June 2011. The preceding six years have seen a steady series of five amendments to the Combination Regulations[1], the primary regulations which supplement the merger control provisions under the Competition Act, 2002 (Act), to bring greater certainty, transparency and ease in relation to the Competition Commission of India (CCI) filing processes. In line with this trend and overarching objective of promoting the ease of doing business in India, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, recently issued a notification dated 29 June 2017 (Notification) which has done away with the strict filing timeline of 30 calendar days from the date of the trigger document. The Notification is applicable for a tenure of 5 years until 28 June 2022. This piece briefly examines issues with this strict statutory timeline and the welcome ramifications that ensue this policy change.

A proposed acquisition of shares, voting rights, control or assets or a merger/amalgamation which satisfies the pecuniary statutory thresholds set out under the Act and is unable to benefit from applicable exemptions under the Act or the Combination Regulations is reportable to the CCI. Such a pre-merger notification was required to be filed within the timeline as set under the Act. Originally, parties to a notifiable transaction were required to notify the CCI within 7 days of receiving board approval for a merger or amalgamation, or pursuant to the execution of any agreement or other document in case of an acquisition (Trigger Document). Subsequently, by way of an amendment in 2007, the filing timeline was extended from 7 to 30 days.

Continue Reading India Bids Adieu to 30 Day Notification Regime

This piece was first published in the August 2017 issue of The Practical Lawyer [(2017) PL (Comp. L) August 80]


Price fixing arrangements strike at the very heart of antitrust violations since they go against the accepted norm of price being determined by market forces. Such arrangements raise concerns in both horizontal and vertical markets. Under the scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act), while horizontal pricing agreements (between competitors) are presumed to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC), there is no such presumption in the case of vertical agreements (between entities operating at different levels of the value chain), where the “rule of reason” approach is applied.

Interestingly, the treatment of vertical agreements and in particular resale price maintenance (RPM)[i], has been long debated in many jurisdictions. Initially, antitrust authorities in mature jurisdictions were in agreement that RPM, in principle, was a per se violation and as such, not subject to any justification. However, acknowledging the need for relaxation, the US Supreme Court and the European Commission refrained from adopting a strict per se presumptive approach in cases of RPM to apply the “rule of reason” standard. On the other hand, national competition authorities in the European Union continue to take a hostile approach towards RPM without considering any pro-competitive effects that may arise. Moreover, in the Indian context, while the CCI had reiterated the statutory construct in dealing with RPM, by stating that AAEC needs to be determined on basis of the factors provided under Section 19(3) of the Act, until recently the treatment of RPM (including its scope and standard of proof) lacked clarity.

Continue Reading Resale Price Maintenance : Has CCI Upped the Ante?

On 31 October 2017, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) passed cease and desist orders against certain national and regional trade associations of film artists and producers for engaging in practices of controlling/limiting the supply of services and market sharing. Such acts have been held to be in contravention of Sections 3(3)(b) and 3(3)(c) read with Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act).

Background

Mr. Vipul Shah (Informant), a producer of films, filed an information against Artists’ Associations, comprising the All India Film Employees Confederation, Federation of Western India Cine Employees (FWICE) and its affiliated associations[1], as well as Producers’ Associations, comprising the Indian Motion Picture Producers Association, the Film and Television Producers Guild of India, and the Indian Film and Television Producers Council (Artists’ Associations and Producers’ Associations are collectively referred to as the Opposite Parties). The information alleged a contravention of provisions of the Competition Act on the grounds that:

Continue Reading CCI Reprimands Film Industry Trade Unions for Engaging in Anti-Competitive Behaviour

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has imposed a cumulative penalty of INR 120 million (approx. USD 1.87 million) on ten coal and sand transporters (Opposite Parties or OPs) for bid-rigging. The OPs were found to have rigged the bids submitted in relation to four tenders for coal and sand transportation floated by Western Coalfields Limited (Informant), a subsidiary of the state-owned monopolist, Coal India Limited.[1]

The information filed with the CCI alleged contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) on the ground that the OPs had quoted identical prices, which were suspiciously higher than the rates quoted for the same jobs in the recent past.

Continue Reading Coal Transporters Penalised for Bid-Rigging

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India (MCA), has through a notification published on August 30th, 2017, exempt reconstitution, transfer of whole or any part thereof and amalgamation of nationalised banks under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 and Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980, from merger control scrutiny for a period of 10 years (Notification).

Continue Reading Nationalized Banks Exempt from Merger Control Scrutiny

The Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 (Leniency Regulations) have been amended by a notification issued on 22 August 2017 (Notification). The Leniency Regulations supplement Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002, which sets out the statutory provision for grant of leniency in matters involving cartels and enables parties to ‘blow the whistle’ on cartel arrangements and avail up to 100% reduction in penalties.

The amendments have been introduced after nearly seven years since the introduction of the leniency regime in India, addressing substantive issues faced by the industry. The formal amendments are largely in line with the draft amendments issued in March 2017 wherein the Competition Commission of India (CCI) invited comments from various stakeholders.

This update briefly captures the key amendments and the potential implications on the effectiveness of the leniency programme in India.

Continue Reading Leniency Regulations Amended

The latest addition to the string of changes introduced by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) this year is an exemption to Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) from the applicability of the merger control regime. The MCA introduced a notification on August 10, 2017 (Notification), which stipulates that Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act), which relate to regulation of combinations, will not apply to amalgamations of RRBs for which the Central Government has issued a notification under Section 23A(1) of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (RRB Act). This exemption is applicable for a period of five years, i.e., until August 9, 2022.

The RRB Act was enacted to provide for the incorporation, regulation and winding up of RRBs in order to develop the rural economy and particularly enhance the credit facilities available to marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, artisans and small entrepreneurs. Under section 3(1) of the RRB Act, the Central Government can establish a RRB in any state or union territory, upon a request being made by a bank that proposes to sponsor the RRB.

Continue Reading MCA’s Merger Control Exemption for Regional Rural Banks